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UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
Fourth Amendment Balancing and Searches into
the Body
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit upheld as reasonable the surgical removal of a bullet from
the defendant's body without his consent. The author analyzes
the court's reasoning and suggests an analytical approach for
courts to use when dealing with such bodily intrusions. The au-
thor concludes that the courts should weigh such factors as the
seriousness of the crime, the importance of the evidence, the
probability of obtaining the evidence, the availability of alterna-
tive evidence and the risk of danger to the defendant.
Acting on information obtained from a confederate, the Wash-
ington, D.C. police arrested James L. Crowder for the slaying of Dr.
James Bowman. The police believed that two bullets fired from the
same pistol that slayed the decedent were embedded within Crow-
der's body.' Desiring the bullets for use at trial the police brought
Crowder to D.C. GeneralHopsital. Their suspicions were confirmed
when x-rays disclosed metal slugs lodged in his left thigh and right
forearm.' The state subsequently obtained a limited court order
authorizing the surgical removal of the bullet in Crowder's arm by
establishing probable cause3 to believe that Crowder had killed the
decedent and that evidence of the crime was located inside his body,
and through submission of a medical affidavit that attested to the
minimal nature of the surgery required to obtain the bullet.' The
1. The police based their belief on information obtained from an informant and the
circumstances of the case. The informant told the police that she and Crowder went to the
victim's office to rob him. When Crowder confronted the victim with a toy pistol, the victim
reached into his desk drawer and picked up a revolver. A scuffle ensued between the victim
and Crowder. The informant fled, hearing gun shots as she ran. After rejoining her, Crowder
stated that he had been shot twice but thought he had killed the victim. In the vicinity of
this meeting, the police later found a .32 caliber Smith & Wesson revolver with four of its six
chambers empty. The two wounds in Crowder's body, together with the fact that the deceased
had been shot twice by a .32 caliber firearm, and the condition of the weapon found near the
scene of the crime (four or its six chambers were empty), raised the inference that the two
missing rounds were embedded within Crowder's wounds.
2. The record does not indicate that the state obtained a warrant before x-rays were
administered. A Connecticut court recently has required that a warrant be obtained prior to
taking x-rays of an in-custody defendant. State v. Anonymous, 32 Conn. Supp. 306, 353 A.2d
789 (Super. Ct. 1976).
3. The existence of probable cause was unchallenged by both the defense and the dissent.
4. The doctor's affidavit, in discussing the extent of the surgery, stated that "[ilt was
a very superficial wound .... [lit is a superficial lesion, just like removing a small seba-
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denial of a petition for writ of prohibition against execution of the
court order paved the way both for the surgery and the admission
into evidence of the discovered bullet at Crowder's trial. Upon con-
viction Crowder appealed, contending inter alia' that the district
court erred in receiving into evidence the bullet removed without his
consent. Initially the court of appeals reversed the district court.7
On rehearing en banc, held, affirmed: Surgery to obtain a bullet
from the body of a suspect as evidence of his crime is a constitution-
ally permissible search.' United States v. Crowder, 543 F.2d 312
(D.C. Cir. 1976).
With the increasing application of scientific techniques to po-
lice investigatory procedures, the courts have been compelled to
confront fourth amendment problems not contemplated by the fra-
mers of the constitution.9 These techniques include electronic eaves-
dropping,10 blood testing," use of voice exemplars, 12 x-rays, 13 labora-
tory analysis of fingernail scrapings" and other scientific develop-
ments."5 Although these techniques are primarily used to identify
ceous cyst; it would not produce any lasting defect that I can envision." 543 F.2d at 314. The
court refused to permit the removal of the bullet in Crowder's leg because the doctor indicated
that it posed a significantly greater risk of danger to the defendant.
5. Crowder also argued that the denial of a self-defense instruction to the jury was
reversible error. This note will not deal with that issue.
6. It has been held that bullets obtained through an operation on the defendant to which
he consented in advance were not excludable on the basis of unreasonable search and seizure.
Webb v. State, 467 S.W.2d 449 (Tex. Crim, App. 1971).
7. United States v. Crowder, 513 F.2d 395 (D.C. Cir. 1975). This opinion was withdrawn
upon notice of rehearing en banc.
8. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
9. See generally, Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886); J. LANDYNSKI, SEARCHES AND
SEIZURES AND THE SUPREME COURT (1966); Weinreb, Generalities of the Fourth Amendment
42 U. CHI. L. REV. 47 (1974). These sources indicate that the hated "general warrant" issued
by the British particularly concerned the drafters of the fourth amendment.
10. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438 (1928).
11. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966); Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432
(1957); Graves v. Beto, 424 F.2d 524 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 960 (1970).
12. United States v..Dionisio, 410.U.S. 1 (1973).
13. State v. Anonymous, 32 Conn. Supp. 306, 353 A.2d 789 (Super. Ct. 1976).
14. Cupp v. Murphy,"412 U.S. 291 (1973).
15. Other instances of forensic science raising fourth amendment questions are Davis v.
Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969) (fingerprinting); United States v. Bridges, 499 F.2d 179 (7th
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the perpetrator of a crime, the police have begun to apply them to
the gathering of evidence bearing directly on the crime itself.' Re-
gardless of the technique employed, common to them all is a level
of intrusiveness unrecognized (and unprovided for) when the fourth
amendment was adopted." In this context the important question
is posed: what is the proper analysis the courts should apply when
confronted with such highly intrusive police conduct.18 In answering
this question a framework of analysis will first be developed and
then applied to the intrusions made in the instant case.
Both the majority and the dissent in Crowder cite Schmerber
v. California'" as controlling precedent for their position on the rea-
sonableness of the search. In Schmerber, the Supreme Court upheld
the admission into evidence of the results of a nonconsensual blood
test, rejecting appellant's claims under the fourth and fifth amend-
ment ' " and the fourteenth amendment due process clause." The
Cir.) (swabbing the suspect's hands with a chemical agent to determine if he had recently
handled explosives), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1010 (1974); United States v. D'Amico, 408 F.2d
331 (2d Cir. 1969) (snipping strands of the suspect's hair); United States ex rel. Parson v.
Anderson, 354 F. Supp. 1060 (D. Del. 1972) (fingernail scraping, combing of pubic hair, and
blood test), aff'd, 418 F.2d 94 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1072 (1973); cf. People v.
Williams, 164 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 858, 331 P.2d 251 (1958) (administering Nalline test to
determine if suspect is under the influence of drugs).
16. This latter development is in part attributable to the demise of the "mere evidence"
rule, thereby removing constitutional restraints that previously limited the police to search-
ing for instrumentalities and fruits of crime along with contraband, while prohibiting their
search for mere evidence of a crime. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), overruling
Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921). Arguably all forensic techniques (i.e. finger-
printing, voice and handwriting exemplars, etc.) are ultimately employed for evidentiary
purposes. Certain techniques are distinguishable from others, however, in that their eviden-
tiary value does not depend on the biological uniqueness of the suspect (for example, elec-
tronic eavesdropping and alcohol blood testing). The application of these highly intrusive
invasions have troubled the courts because of their adverse effects on the individual's right
of privacy. See cases cited note 15, supra.
17. See note 9, supra.
18. Under the majority's statement of the facts this case provides a textbook example of
the problem. The state not only established probable cause for the court order but provided
the suspect with a hearing and counsel to determine the matter, followed by right of appeal.
The order issued by the court was narrowly drawn permitting removal only of the bullet in
the suspect's arm and only under the most stringent medical guidelines.
19. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
20. Appellant argued that the blood test was testimonial in character and so its introduc-
tion into evidence violated his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The
Court rejected this claim stating: "The distinction which has emerged, often expressed in
different ways, is that the privilege is a bar against compelling 'communications' or
'testimony,' but that compulsion which makes a subject or accused the source of 'real or
physical evidence' does not violate it." Id. at 764.
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NOTES
Court, which had previously condoned the use of nonconsensual
blood tests, took the opportunity in Schmerber to place them
squarely within a fourth amendment framework." The Court ana-
lyzed the case by applying traditional fourth amendment questions
to the search, implicitly holding that blood tests and body intru-
sions were not per se unreasonable. The search was found reasonable
because sufficient probable cause existed for the officer to believe
that alcohol would be found in the suspect's blood, the test applied
was itself reasonable, and the manner in which it was conducted was
reasonable. 3
The majority in Crowder felt that the Schmerber standard was
satisfied by four elements: (1) the establishment of probable cause
that Crowder was the murderer and that evidence was lodged within
his body; (2) the procedural protections afforded the defendant for
challenging issuance of the order; (3) the minor nature of the surgery
involved; and (4) the stringent medical safeguards taken in his be-
half." In so holding, the majority ignored the specific considerations
that convinced the Court in Schmerber to find that blood tests were
themselves reasonable tests. The majority instead chose to focus on
the reasonableness of the manner in which the search was performed
The Court limited its holding to an interpretation of the federal privilege and expressed
no opinion as to broader state self-incrimination privileges. However, a state court in which
a broad self-incrimination privilege existed ("No person . . . shall be compellable to give
evidence for or against himself." GA. CODE ANN. §§ 38-416 (1974)) compelled a defendant to
submit to a nonconsensual surgical search for a bullet to be admitted into evidence against
him. Creamer v. State, 229 Ga. 511, 192 S.E.2d 350 (1972), cert. dismissed, 410 U.S. 975
(1973). This decision was seriously questioned but followed by a lower Georgia court. Allison
v. State, 129 Ga. App. 364, 199 S.E.2d 587 (1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1145 (1974).
21. Neither Schmerber nor. Crowder found violations of due process. In both instances,
the courts found procedural satisfaction of the standards enunciated in Rochin v. California,
342 U.S. 165 (1952). In.the context of the issues herein raised, note Justice Black's remark in
Breithaupt v. Abrams, 352 U.S. 432 (1957):
We should, in my opinion, hold that due process means at least that law enforce-
ment officers in their efforts to obtain evidence from persons suspected of crime
must stop short of bruising the body, breaking skin, puncturing tissue or extract-
ing body fluids, whether they contemplate doing it by force or stealth.
Id. at 442.
22. Breithaupt v. Abrams, 352 U.S. 432 (1957), while constitutionally validating blood
tests, did so on due process grounds. This was partly because the exclusionary rule had not
yet been applied to the states. After the Court's decision applying the exclusionary rule to
the states in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), the question of the reasonableness of the
search under the fourth amendment became primary.
23. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. at 768-72.
24. 543 F.2d at 316.
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and the existence of probable cause.2" The majority cited Schmerber
in support of its holding by quoting broad fourth amendment dicta
stated therein." A close reading of both cases will suggest that each
court confronts the fourth amendment problem similarly by apply-
ing a "reasonableness under the circumstances" approach. 7
Crowder, however, neither mentions the specific reasonableness cri-
teria that guided the Court in Schmerber" to approve blood tests
nor formulates specific criteria of its own.2"
Unlike the majority, the dissent in Crowder examined and re-
lied upon the specific policy considerations found in Schmerber.
The dissent argued that blood tests and surgery differed signifi-
cantly in that surgery was not commonplace and involves far greater
risk, pain, and trauma. In addition, the dissent noted that surgery
has no deterrent effect on criminal behavior, in contrast to the dis-
cernible effect that blood tests may have on drunk driving. Moreo-
ver, while blood tests are generally dispositive of the question of
inebriation, surgery offers no similar conclusiveness."0 Finally the
dissent contended that judges lack the competency to authorize
nonconsensual surgery because of the multitude of medical consid-
erations involved and the lack of reliable medical guidance."
25. Id.
26. The majority quoted language from Schmerber: "[Tihe Fourth Amendment's pro-
per function is to constrain, not against all instrusions as such, but against intrusions which
are not justified in the circumstances, or which are made in an improper manner." 543 F.2d
at 316, citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. at 768.
27. This formulation of the applicable standard appears throughout fourth amendment
case law. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. at 768; Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 33 (1963);
United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 61-64 (1950); Go-Bart Importing Co., v. United
States, 282 U.S. 344, 357-58 (1931).
28. 384 U.S. at 770-72.
29. The author of the majority opinion, dissenting on the first appeal decision, argued
that the surgery could be justified by the state's interest "in bringing a murderer to book."
United States v. Crowder, 513 F.2d at 405 (opinion withdrawn).
30. The fact that a bullet removed from Crowder's body is shown to come from the same
gun that killed the victim does not conclusively establish-that Crowder killed the victim.
31. Among the considerations raised by the dissent to support this contention are that:
(1) little guidance from precedent is available to aid the judge in making his determination;
(2) an infinite amount of variables are involved, thus preventing the development of a useful
body of case law and further complicating the decisionmaking process; (3) an absence of
safeguards insuring the accuracy of medical evidence exists; (4) an unequal access to medical
experts prevents the judge from obtaining the wide range of medical opinion necessary for
the issuance of medically safe court orders; and (5) potentially disastrous consequences can
result if either the judge is misled or the medical practitioner errs.
Courts have, however, made decisions in the past involving medical considerations in a
reliable fashion. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11
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Thus the majority and dissent in Crowder rely on different
aspects of Schmerber and consequently fail to directly confront each
other's arguments. The result is not surprising in light of the precau-
tionary language"2 stated in Schmerber and the variety of issues
raised. The difficulty in coherently applying Schmerber has been
evidenced by the various propositions for which it has been cited by
other courts.33
Although Schmerber is the Supreme Court decision most
closely paralleling Crowder factually, its factual bearing on Crowder
is not free from limitation; that is, the former involved a blood test
to establish intoxication of a driver, while the latter involved surgery
to obtain evidence for the prosecution of a suspected murderer. The
Crowder majority circumvents this. factual distinction by relying
upon Schmerber's broad fourth amendment language rather than
its specific analysis of the facts.3 4 The majority is thus able to avoid
the specific medical considerations stated in Schmerber which the
dissent deemed so important. Moreover, through use of a
"reasonableness under the circumstances" approach, the court is
able to distinguish the condoned surgery from the aggravated and
(1905); In re President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964). See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Huguez v. United
States, 406 F.2d 366 (9th Cir. 1968); Blefare v. United States, 362 F.2d 870 (9th Cir. 1966).
32. The Court somewhat ambiguously limited its holding, stating: "That we today hold
that the Constitution does not forbid the States minor intrustions into a individual's body
under stringently limited conditions in no way indicates that it permits more substantial
intrusions, or intrusions under other conditions." 384 U.S. at 772 (emphasis added). However,
nowhere in the opinion.does the Court specifically define what is meant by "minor intrusions"
and "more substantial intrusions," nor does it expressly forbid more substantial intrusions.
33. See, e.g., Graves v. Beto, 424 F.2d 524 (5th Cir.) (a blood test must be consented to
unless taken under emergency conditions), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 960 (1970); Rivas v. United
States, 368 F.2d 703, 710 (9th Cir. 1966) (if a border search is to include an exploration of
body cavities there must be a "clear indication" that evidence is hidden therein), cert. denied,
386 U.S. 945 (1967); Brown v. Jones, 407 F. Supp. 686 (W.D. Tex. 1974) (the fourth amend-
ment does not protect against warrantless searches per se, but only against unreasonable
searches and whether a search is unreasonable is to be determined by the facts of a given
case), aff'd sub nom. Brown v. Estelle, 526 F.2d 1391 (5th Cir. 1976); United States ex rel.
Parson v. Anderson, 354 F. Supp. 1060, 1087 (D. Del. 1972) (a warrantless search of the person
after a legal arrest does not violate the fourth amendment), aff'd, 481 F.2d 94 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1072 (1973); United States v. Rubin, 343 F. Supp. 625, 630 (E.D. Pa. 1972)
(a warrant may be unnecessary where the evidence ultimately seized is in the process of
destruction), vacated, 474 F.2d 262 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 833 (1973). See also
Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 463-64 n.393
(1974).
34. See note 26 supra.
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brutal conduct present in Rochin v. California.;" In this manner the
majority utilizes the distinction to illustrate the procedural safe-
guards and medical precautions which were present in Crowder, but
absent in Rochin. However, the court never squarely confronted the
problem of justifying the more significant intrusion of surgery as
compared with blood tests. It is submitted that the justification
may be found in the greater state interest "in bringing a murderer
to book"3 in contrast to that involved in convicting an inebriated
driver. If so, it appears that implicit in the majority's opinion is a
fourth amendment balancing test against which their decision
should be tested.3 7
Before applying this balancing analysis to the instant case, it
is necessary to establish the conflicting fourth amendment values
which it embodies. Although the fourth amendment does not specif-
ically provide for it," the right to privacy is the most often men-
tioned right protected by that amendment. 9 The individual's inter-
est in privacy must be weighed against the various state interests
which sanction the intrustions that occur during searches. 0 These
interests include, but are not limited to, the need for reasonable
police investigation," maintaining the moral equilibrium, 2 and de-
terring criminal behavior. Essentially the reasonableness of the
search (and hence its constitutionality) is determined by balancing
the two interests against one another in light of the circumstances
35. 342 U.S. 765 (1952).
36. See note 29 supra.
37. See generally Amsterdam, supra note 34, at 388-95; LaFave, "Street Encounter" and
the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters, and Beyond, 67 MICH. L. REV. 39, 53-59 (1968);
Comment, 27 BAYLOR L. REV. 305, 313-16 (1975).
38. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350-51 (1967).
39. See Katz v. Untied States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S.
294, 304 (1967); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966); United States v. Jeffers,
342 U.S. 48, 52 (1951); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948); Harris v. United
States, 331 U.S. 145, 150 (1947); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932); Boyd
v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886). See generally Clark, Constitutional Sources of the
Penumbral Privacy, 19 ViLL. L. REv. 833, 857-71 (1974); Weinreb, Generalities of the Fourth
Amendment, 42 U. CHI. L. REv. 47 (1974). See also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
484-86 (1965).
40. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1968); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523,
536-37 (1967); Note, 14 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 680 (1967); THE SUPREME COURT, 1967 TERM, 82
HARV. L. REV. 63, 178-96 (1968).
41. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968).
42. See Kant, The Right to Punish, PUNISHMENT AND REHABILITATION 35 (1973).
43. See, e.g., Blackford v. United States, 247 F.2d 745, 752 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied,
356 U.S. 914 (1958).
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of the case.4" The justification required for a search varies with the
level of intrusiveness; a highly intrusive search requires greater jus-
tification than a less intrusive search.45
The proposed balancing analysis finds considerable support in
past declarations of the Court,"5 in the judicial treatment of the
44. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1968); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523,
536-37 (1967); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948); United States v. Rubin, 474
F.2d 262, 268 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 833 (1973).
In Terry, the Court made its most definitive statement on the manner of determining
reasonableness, when it stated:
In order to assess the reasonableness of officer McFadden's conduct as a general
proposition, it is necessary "first to focus upon the government interest which
allegedly justifies official intrusion upon the constitutionally protected interests
of the private citizen," for there is "no ready test for determining reasonableness
other than by balancing the need to search [or seize] against the invasion which
the search [or seizure] entails."
392 U.S. at 20-21, quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-35, 536-37 (1967).
See also Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767-68 (1966). As suggested previously, if this
is the correct analysis of fourth amendment questions, the majority's disposition of the issue
in Crowder is consistent with traditional fourth amendment methodology. See generally M.
TOBIAS & R. PETERSEN, PRE-TRIAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (1972).
45. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), is particularly instructive in that the Court essen-
tially held that because a "stop and frisk" involved a lesser instrustion than a full search,
the police officer's justification for the instrustion could be correspondingly less than probable
cause. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 378 U.S. 523 (1967), for an application of this premise
to the requirement of probable cause for issuance of a warrant.
Other analyses of reasonableness have been mentioned by the Court in the past. An
example is "reasonableness under the circumstances" which, apparently, is the same analysis
under a different name. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 33-34 (1963); United States v. Rabi-
nowitz, 399 U.S. 56, 63-66 (1950): Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 150 (1947); Go-Bart
Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 356-58 (1931). Another example is the equating
of reasonableness with probable cause. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479 (1963);
Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 310 (1959). This contention, however, has generally
been directed to preventing warrantless searches on less than probable cause, rather than
stating the definitive requirements of reasonableness. Both Wong Sun and Draper, for exam-
ple, involved warrantless arrests. Moreover, a search may still be invalidated although proba-
ble cause exists if it is not conducted in a reasonable manner or by reasonable means. See
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
46. Prior to Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), the case law contained a variety
of distinctions in the standards the government must meet before a search was reasonable,
indicating an implicit balancing test. E.g., Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 366-67
(1964) (the inherent nature of a car permitted lesser grounds of justification for a search than
a house); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 151 n.15 (1947) (a search of a house requires
more justification than a search of a business); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 588-91
(1946) (the government may seize property if it is produced for administrative purposes
although the government may not seize it if testimonial in nature); Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132, 150-53 (1925) (the inherent nature of car permitted lesser grounds of justifica-
tion for a search than a house); Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921) (mere evidence
could not be seized while "fruits" and "instrumentalities" of a crime and contraband could),
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underlying policies involved,47 and in decisions upholding warrant-
less searches." Moreover, the literal text of both clauses of the
fourth amendment facilititates a balancing analysis. The first
clause explicitly recognizes a reasonableness requirement, and the
second clause incorporates a balancing analysis into the probable
overruled, Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967). See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S.
160, 182-83; (Jackson, J., dissenting) cited by the majority in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 18
n.15 (the more serious the crime the lesser the government showing required to justify a
search); see Weinreb, supra note 9, at 70-73.
Katz also suggests a balancing approach by inquiring into the individual's reliance on
privacy on the occasion he was searched to determine whether a warrant was necessary. The
more the individual relies on his privacy, the heavier is the state's burden to provide justifica-
tion for the search and to explain why a warrant was not procured.
47. For example, the Court has recognized that the right of privacy is not absolute, but
rather depends on the reasonableness of the individual's expectation of privacy. Katz v.
United States, 397 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). The successive levels of
justification required for increasingly intrusive searches at borders exemplify the Court's
varying respect for the right of privacy. See, e.g., Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S.
266 (1973) (a person may be stopped at a border and be required to identify himself and his
belongings without any cause shown based on the interest of national protection); Henderson
v. United States, 390 F.2d 805, 808 (9th Cir. 1967) (a traveler may be forced to disrobe,
however, only where there is a "real suspicion"); Rivas v. United States, 368 F.2d 703, 710
(9th Cir. 1966) (more intrusive searches into the traveler's body cavities require a showing of
"clear indication as plain suggestion of smuggling"). In order to conduct a search involving
an intrusion into the individual's body, there must be a "clear indication" that the evidence
sought is enclosed therein. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 769-70 (1966); People
v. Bracamonte, 15 Cal. 3d 394, 403, 540 P.2d 624, 630, 124 Cal. Rptr. 528, 534 (1975).
The state's justification for conducting the search lies in its proving that it had a reason-
able basis to believe that the evidence sought would be discovered during the search. See
Spinnelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964); Draper
v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959). See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); Scimer-
ber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 769-70 (1966). The scope of the search may be broadened as
probable cause increases. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 17-19.
The state's justification for conducting the search also varies with the government's
interest in either deterring the conduct involved, e.g., Breithaupt v. Abrams, 352 U.S. 432,
439-40 (1957), or having the criminal be punished for his crime, e.g., Moore v. United States,
353 A.2d 16, 28-29 (D.C. Ct. App. 1974) (dissenting opinion).
48. The Court has used exigent circumstances to justify warrantless searches where the
exigent circumstances are established prior to the search. E.g., United States v. Edwards,
415 U.S. 800 (1974) (The police may search to prevent the entry of contraband and weapons
into a jail by an arrestee); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S: 752 (1969) (the police may search
the area in the control of the arrestee for self-protection); Preston v. United States, 376 U.S.
364, 367 (1964) (the police may search to prevent the destruction of evidence); Carroll v.
United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (the police may search to prevent the loss of evidence due
to the ease with which an automobile may be moved out of a locality). See also 1 J. VARON,
SEARCHES, SEIZURES AND IMMUNITIES 252-54 (2d ed. 1974). The implication is that for the
government to search without a warrant and thus abrogate the procedural safeguards of the
fourth amendment, it must supply additional justification based on the circumstances of the
case in addition to those which would have had to have been proffered to obtain a warrant.
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cause requirement" together with an ultimate requirement that all
searches (warranted and nonwarranted) conform to the standard of
reasonableness.50 It is submitted that the questions posed by the
instant nonconsensual surgical search are better analyzed within
this established balancing of interests framework.51
In light of the foregoing analysis, it is submitted that noncon-
sensual surgery should be forbidden unless at the time of the request
the state can demonstrate: (1) probable cause that the evidence
sought will be obtained by the search;5" (2) that the serious intru-
siveness is justified by the serious nature of the crime;53 (3) that the
risk of danger, permanent injury and serious deformity to the sus-
pect are minimal,54 (4) that no reasonable alternatives currently
exist for proving the point that the sought evidence would demon-
strate; and (5) the set of facts which the sought evidence would
prove are an essential element of the government's case without
which they cannot proceed. These requisite criteria acknowledge
49. This balancing test, similar to that of reasonableness, involves a balancing of the
intrusion against the government's need to search, Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523,
534-37 (1967), and a weighing of the probabilities of finding that which is sought in light of
the evidence offered to establish its existence, Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964); Carroll
v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
50. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 66
(1950); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 150 (1946); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S.
452, 464 (1932); White v. United States, 271 F.2d 829 (D.C. Cir. 1959). In White, the court
of appeals stated that "[rleasonableness, whether or not there is a search warrant, is the
ultimate constitutional test of the lawfulness of a search or seizure." 271 F.2d at 830. See also
J. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT 42-43 (1966).
51. The overall desirability of analyzing fourth amendment questions in this manner is
beyond the scope of this note, although this question has been discussed by a few commenta-
tors. See Amsterdam, supra note 33 at 387-95; Lafave, supra note 37 at 53-59. In situations
where a magistrate may apply the balancing test in a full and fair manner, this approach
does offer the promise of a better reasoned body of precedent, as long as the considerations
behind the various judicial determinations are fully stated.
52. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 306-07 (1967).
53. Bearing in mind that the intrusion is extremely burdensome on the suspect, surgery
should not be performed unless the alleged crime is of an equal or more serious magnitude.
Otherwise, the court would be subjecting the suspect to investigatory procedures more pun-
ishing than the possible sentence that could result. Moreover, this requirement protects the
police from using surgery as a form of harassment for petty offenses committed by suspected
offenders who are in their disfavor.
54. All three of these factors are particularly crucial in light of the suspect's presumed
innocence. If any of them were to occur, the suspect would have been de facto punished before
conviction.
55. If either reasonable alternatives exist or the evidence sought is merely corroborative,
then of course surgery should not be permitted. Any loss suffered by the state may in part be
remedied by permitting the state to comment upon the defendant's unwillingness to submit
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
the great magnitude of the intrusion wrought by surgery and at-
tempt to harmonize it with the important state interest in prosecut-
ing serious crime. In so doing, a heavier burden is expressly imposed
upon the state to justify a search into the person than, for example,
to justify frisk searches" or searches of homes. These criteria, how-
ever, recognize the theoretical permissibility of such searches. This
recognition, moreover, is in accord with both common law"7 and
constitutional precedent." The very acceptance of a balancing anal-
ysis encourages this result through its implicit lack of absolute limi-
tation." Finally, contrary to the fears of the dissent, courts have
shown an ability to make the proposed substantive determinations
in precisely the manner suggested herein."°
If these criteria had been applied to the instant case, the sur-
to surgery. This may be effective in cases where the surgery could have proved the defendant's
innocence. On the other hand, the defendant may rebut the state's implications by demon-
strating both the existence of alternative methods of proving the point and the severity of
the search. Since this is a fourth amendment problem, self-incrimination issues are not
controlling. See, e.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
56. Less justification is required in a stop and frisk search due to the lower degree of
intrusion. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
57. The body has not been viewed as immune from intrusion at civil common law,
although an intrusion must be specifically sanctioned by a statute. Camden & Suburban Ry.
v. Stetson, 177 U.S. 172, 174 (1900); Pennsylvania Co. v. Newmeyer, 129 Ind. 401, 28 N.E.
860 (1891); Stock by New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 177 Mass. 155, 58 N.E. 686 (1900); McQuigan
v. Delaware & L. & W.R.R., 129 N.Y. 50, 29 N.E. 235 (1891). But see Union Pacific Ry. v.
Botsford, 141 U.S. 250 (1891). See also Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941); FED. R.
Civ. P. 35(a).
58. Constitutional interpretation has permitted states to make direct or indirect bodily
intrusions upon a showing of a substantive state reason. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927);
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905). See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973);
Massie v. Henry, 455 F.2d 779 (4th Cir. 1972); York v. Story, 324 F.2d 450 (9th Cir. 1963),
cert. denied, 376 U.S. 939 (1964).
In People v. Vega, 51 App. Div. 2d 33, 379 N.Y.S. 2d 419 (1976), a New York court applied
a substantive due process analysis to the question: can the police require a suspect to remove
a beard before entering a police liigeup? This suggests an alternative anaylsis for fourth
amendment searches involving intrusions upon the individual's person.
59. A bottom line beneath which police conduct may not fall may be found in Rochin v.
California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). See also United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 433, 431 (1973)
(discussing minimum due process requirements of police conduct where defense of entrap-
ment was raised). For other examples of Rochin used in this manner in a fourth amendment
context, see United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974); United States ex. rel.
Guy v. McCauley, 385 F. Supp. 193 (E.D. Wis. 1974).
60. See Bowden v. State, 256 Ark. 820, 510 S.W.2d 879 (1974); People v. Smith, 80 Misc.
2d 210, 362 N.Y.S. 2d 909 (1974), wherein both courts refused to permit surgery where the
risk of permanent injury to the suspect was significant although the state's need for the search
was great. See also Adams v. State, 260 Ind. 663, 299 N.E. 2d 834 (1973) (surgery was
absolutely prohibited because of the serious personal intrusion involved).
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gery probably would not have been permitted because the state
failed to demonstrate a compelling need to obtain the bullet to
prosecute the case successfully. Crowder by his own testimony ad-
mitted his presence in the victim's office at the time of the slaying
and further admitted wrestling with the victim for control of the
death weapon shortly before the killing. Moreover, Crowder's princi-
ple defenses were that the murder was committed by a third ac-
complice and, in the alternative, that the shooting had occurred in
self-defense." Neither of these defenses would have been substan-
tially affected by the introduction into evidence of the seized bullet.
The seized bullet's sole evidentiary role was to corroborate a fact
admitted by the defendant. Unless the defendant had denied his
presence at the scene of the crime when the court order was sought,
the evidence should have been excluded and the district court's
refusal to do so would have been grounds for reversal at the appel-
late level.6"
The application of a balancing analysis to fourth amendment
problems, particularly those involving intrusions against the indi-
vidual's body, will greatly assist judges in making well reasoned
decisions. As a result, a more complete understanding of the full
range of interests involved and the relative weight each should be
accorded in the decisionmaking process would be established and
more fully reviewed. In this context, Crowder makes a small contri-
bution, although it fails to consider all the variables.
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61. This alternative defense, which was the second issue Crowder raised on appeal, was
rejected because, inter alia, it clearly conflicted with his first defense.
62. Arguably it could be contended that the error was minor and should not be grounds
for reversal. Since a principle justification for the exclusionary rule is deterrence (Brown v.
Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 599 (1975) and since unnecessary and unlawful surgical searches are
particularly abhorrent, deterrence of unreasonable surgery could have been a rationale for
reversal.
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